26 July 1951

HEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT:

EGFIERD Discussions in London on 18 and 19 July.

- 1. During discussions with the British on FIEND problems on the afternoons of 18 and 19 July, the following points which are of interest to you were brought up:
 - a. The British are following a single political party team system at the moment. In other words, all the members of a single team belong to the same party. When I explained that we were mixing up parties in order to make up the most effective teams based on the individual abilities of the men, they expressed surprise that we have achieved such control over our Albenians and stated that they would try to do the same thing in the future.
 - b. The British consider it desirable to resume leaflet drops in the near future, particularly since a long time has elepsed since our last drop. I emplained that our bem on drops has expired technically, but before resumption we would have to secure the concurrence of the Department of State. I further explained that I too consider it desirable to resume drops, especially as the Yugoslav-sponsored committee had distributed a rather strongly worded leaflet not so long age. The British then stated that they have approximately 900,000 leaflets (of three types) on hand and that two of these types are possibly out of date. It was agreed that we should push the propaganda subsemmittee and obtain several new texts guitably worded to avoid giving the impression that some spectacular operation may be imminent. In this some tion proper instructions should be sent to

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c. The British indicated

- e. The British indicated that before long they hope to be in a position to take over the entire leaflet dropping commitment should we desire to use our air support facilities for other purposes. Since we have only one plane at our disposal at the moment, I told them that we may wish to take advantage of their offer to the extent that they would drop approximately 75% of the leaflets and we would handle the remaining 25%. These drops are to be made by RAF aircraft, probably based in Malta, but the actual clearance for such RAF operations has not some through yet.
- d. The British express some concern over the fact that the VOA is following a line regarding Albania which is contrary to that being followed by the BBC. Having no information on this subject, I was unable to comment. However, we should look into this immediately to determine whether there is any basic difference in the policies governing the political aspects of the two broadcasts. I should like to have a report on this from Mr. Pekich as soon as convenient.
- e. I mentioned to the British the fact that both and informed me in Rome that the Committee were sencermed about the small amount of favorable publicity which the Committee receives in the press, radio and other publicity media. It was agreed that both the British and we would do all we can to secure additional publicity to develop and build up the Committee's prestige and that we would instruct and to direct the efforts of the propaganda subcommittee toward reproduction of material useable for this purpose, i.e., news items and declarations.
- statement by the Committee in regard to the Yugoslavsponsored group and gave the British a copy of the draft
 text prepared by for the Committee newspaper. It
 was agreed that this text would have to be cleared with
 the Department of State and the Foreign Office prior to
 publication in view of the sensitive nature of problems
 involving Yugoslavia. I also stated that I felt it would
 be desirable to introduce this statement into Albania by
 dropping copies of the newspaper or a leaflet and that
 such action could then be followed up by an approach on
 the diplomatic level to the Yugoslavs. After expressing
 some misgivings concerning the attitude of the Foreign
 Office, the British, in the person of

that this action

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that this action would be very effective and desirable. It was decided that we would try to obtain permission for this operation. It was stated by that since an approach had already been made to the Yugoslaws on this subject we could consider that the action at the diplomatic level has taken place.

g. In regard to the offer of a thousand men by the Committee to Gen. Eisenhower, I explained that we were not in a position to exert any control over the ensuer which SHAPE Headquarters would send the Committee. The British saw no particular disadvantage in this as they felt that a megative reply would undoubtedly be forthcoming and regardless of the language in which such a reply is southed, the very fact that the Committee sent SHAPE such an offer would have considerable publicity walve. I therefore think that we should get on with this metter and after carefully wording the letter send it to SHAPE without any further attempts to backstop. I might add that while in Paris I explored SHAPE's probable reaction and found that Gen. Eisenhower is very firm in his view that SHAPE is an international command and cannot, under any circumstances, lend itself to manipulation for special purposes such as ours. In discussing further means for securing publicity for the Committee, it was decided that the Committee could do more in the way of sending telegrams to heads of states and similar persons en special anniversaries, national holidays, etc. For example, on the Albanian national holiday the Committee could send messages to Trumen and Attlee.

Jne 7.28.51

i. | nuggested that it would be very useful if we arranged for a field operational level meeting at quarterly intervals, such meeting to be attended by three representatives of the FIELD staff and three representatives of the VALUABLE staff. I agree that this is desirable and believe that the meetings could alternate among | our representation should consist of | and | hould send out an appropriate message indicating our approval of this scheme.

7.21.51 EON

OMY/els